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Abstrak 
Sebagai negara terbesar nomor dua di bidang ekonomi (setelah AS), 
pilihan kebijakan politik luar negeri Jepang untuk menjadi negara donor 
terbesar (aid super power), dan bukannya sebagai negara super power 
secara politik sangat menarik untuk dipelajari. Paket bantuan Jepang untuk 
negara-negara berkembang, yang disebut ODA (Official Development 
Assistance), mengalami puncaknya pada tahun 1992 dan mengukuhkan 
negara ini sebagai negara donor terbesar di dunia.  
Mulai tahun 2002 Jepang melakukan reformasi kebijakan ODA yang 
disebabkan oleh beberapa faktor seperti insiden 911 dan penurunan 
tingkat perekonomian di dalam negeri. Hal ini sekaligus mengakhiri 
dominasi Jepang sebagai negara donor terbesar. Paper ini akan membahas 
reformasi ODA tersebut dan mengaitkan dampaknya terhadap Indonesia, 
sebagai negara penerima ODA terbesar, dan hubungan kedua negara ini 
pasca reformasi ODA. 
Kata kunci: Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
  
A. Introduction 
As the world’s second largest country 
in term of economic (only next to US), 
Tokyo’s decision to become merely the 
aid super power, instead of political 
super power, is very interesting to 
observe. Because of its economic 
strength, Japan is in capable in 
modernizing its military equipment, 
thanks to the so-called miraculous 
economic growth starting from the 
1960s. All of those facts showed that 
Japan has all the requirements to 
become a super power just like the US. 
However some factors have limited her 
intention to grow more as a politically 
leading country, even in the East Asia 
region. Such factors as the memory of 
the defeat in the WW II, the article 9 in 
the constitution, and the pacifist 
movement in domestic area have been 
played dominant role in reducing the 
intention to play more. 
Those internal factors together with 
the external one, such as its neighbors’ 
hostility due to Japan invasion during 
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WW II, apparently has forced Tokyo to 
formulate its foreign policy in such way 
that it can focus only on the economic 
development. For many years since the 
end of WW II, Japan campaigned as the 
peace loving country. It means that in 
the foreign policy Japan would avoid in 
any involvement in the area of 
international political conflict.  It’s been 
observed by Arase that Japan’s postwar 
foreign policy has been called a “low 
cost, low-risk foreign policy” that allowed 
Japan to focus on economic development 
while avoiding costly military and political 
burdens (Arase, 1993). Regarding to this 
fact, some observers also maintained 
that one of Japan’s economic success 
factors was the low spending in the 
military budget. Although other observers 
would not agree with such premise (see 
Johnson, 1982), it can be denied that its 
foreign policy, at least until the 911 
incident, had been dominated by the so-
called aid diplomacy.  
The foreign aid has been largely used 
since the year of 1976. In fact the 
government enjoyed the massive popular 
encouragement decision to play more in 
the economic field (i.e. foreign aid 
policy). Japan became the great aid 
power since the year of 1992, when its 
aid (ODA) amount was the highest 
among OECD countries.  
There were some critics regarding 
Japanese aid policy, both from its fellow 
OECD countries and from donor recipient 
countries. The US as its close ally since 
the end of WW II, heavily criticized 
Tokyo policy on foreign financial 
assistance as an excuse to the military 
burden-sharing with Washington. When 
the Gulf war took place in 1990, 
Washington put a pressure on Tokyo “to 
do more” than just to give a $1 billion 
package to the multinational force and 
middle-east countries that affected by 
Iraq sanction. On the other hand, the 
critic that often said by recipient 
countries is that the aid is heavily tied 
(i.e. the grants and loans to be used for 
the purchase of Japanese export). It 
seemed that Tokyo had made some 
responds to those critics, especially after 
911 incident occurred. The incident has 
changed the map of international politics 
and, from this paper’s point of view, it 
also induced the ODA scheme as well. 
The reform of ODA was conducted to 
meet the global political and economic 
changes. In addition it is also important 
to note that the reform of the scheme 
was carried out also in response to some 
domestic factors, such as public scrutiny 
and the economic declining.  
The reform of the ODA scheme will be 
discussed in this paper. Also this included 
the impact of the reform to the 
relationship between Japan and recipient 
countries. In this matter, I would like to 
use the case study of Indonesia, as the 
major recipient of Japan’s ODA, 
especially regarding the Aceh Free 
Movement case. 
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B. Japan’s Foreign aid and ODA 
The ODA policy actually first 
implemented in the 1950s and it was 
relatively ignored as an economic policy 
and not be part of overall national 
diplomacy. However since 1980s 
following the economic high growth in 
the 1960s, Japan contribution in the 
economic aid to the developing countries 
has become the second largest, only next 
to the US. And enters the 1990s, it 
became the number one donor country.  
The ODA scheme since 1950s has 
been trough some changes. According to 
Yasutomo (1989), this evolution occurred 
in three phases. Starting from the mid 
1950s to 1973 constituted the first 
phase. In this phase the aid was seen as 
reparation arrangements. The aid was 
given to the Asian countries those were 
invaded by Japan in the WW II. The 
main objective was, of course, economic. 
Japan, then, was in a high growth stage, 
and it required a lot of raw material 
which it can acquire from, mostly, the 
south-east Asian countries. The political 
motive was relatively minor at this stage. 
As a Japanese government official 
acknowledges: “In the 1960s, the main 
motives for Japan’s economic 
cooperation were to promote its exports 
and assist its industries in overseas 
investment…. Promoting commercial ad 
industrial interest was the main purpose 
of such cooperation” (Koichiro Matsura, 
1981). 
The second phase occurred in era 
between 1974 until 1979. Yasutomo 
maintained that two developments in 
particular triggered this take off: PM 
Tanaka’s trip to ASEAN in January 1974, 
and the OPEC oil shock in the winter 
1973-74.  
Tokyo was shocked to the negative 
reaction of the citizens in Jakarta and 
Bangkok during Tanaka’s trip. Those 
demonstrations were not only because of 
the bad memories that still remained of 
the Japan’s invasion in those countries, 
but also during these times Tokyo was 
mainly focus on the commercial 
objectives in making relationship with 
Asian countries. The focus on self-
commercial benefit, while neglecting the 
local-social benefits, such as salary 
adequacy, working-environment safety, 
job security, pollution, etc, which was 
very poor in quality has caused the riot 
to occurred. This event made Tokyo 
began to focus in making good 
relationship with such countries to secure 
its economic benefits also, more 
important, political one. The 
implementation of this intention was a 
pledge of $1 billion dollar for five ASEAN 
regional projects. This pledge was seen 
as the center-piece of the Fukuda 
doctrine (name after the PM Fukuda). We 
can see here, Tanaka and his successor 
moved beyond purely commercial 
objectives to a recognition of aid’s 
usefulness as a political-diplomatic tool in 
the region.  
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Between 1979 and 1985, ODA 
emerged as an increasingly flexible 
multipurpose and multi dimensional pillar 
of Japan’s overall policy as maintained by 
Yasutomo. In early 1980s government 
refer to “aid” and “ODA” to differentiate 
the commercial and development use of 
economic assistance. The Government in 
the era of Prime Minister Takasone 
began to see aid as a potentially positive 
means of helping to mitigate economic 
friction with trade partners. 
 
C. The Reasons for Aid Policy 
Japan has been enjoying its economic 
development for the past four decades. 
The economic size of this country is now 
ranked as the second largest in the 
world. The high economic growth also 
induced in other area, such as military. 
Although based on the article 9 and 
Yoshida Doctrine the military expansion 
is very limited and remains controversy, 
yet the amount of money spent for 
military budget is relatively high. For the 
world’s second largest country in term of 
economic, the limitation of 1% of GNP 
for military budget is enough to enable 
Japan modernized its military equipment.  
The fact that Japan has both 
economic and military strength is enough 
to convince everyone that this country 
has the ‘ingredient’ to become a super 
power country just like the US. However 
the empirical practice showed that Tokyo 
was unable to play a dominant role in the 
world’s politic. In fact it prefers to stay 
focus in the economic matter by giving 
more and more aid to the developing 
countries while receiving the raw material 
needed to support its domestic 
industrialization and at the same time to 
open market for its products in those 
countries. 
This kind of political practice was not 
without any critics. The US as the main 
ally since the post WW II often 
contended its foreign policy, especially 
regarding military contribution to the 
“world peace” defined by the US. When 
the Gulf war took place on 1990, the US 
put a pressure to Tokyo to join with ally 
military force. Yet, Tokyo decided to give 
financial assistance instead of dispatching 
military force. This policy was 
disappointing Washington. This event 
declined the relationship between these 
two countries. 
In his paper, Yasumoto explained why 
Japan chose to become an aid super 
power instead of political super power? 
At least there are 5 reasons for this: 
1. Because it is there: of all diplomatic 
tools, the Japanese find aid 
convenient and available.  
2. Because it works: Aid has been an 
effective diplomatic tool for Japan. 
3. Because it improves Japan’s national 
prestige 
4. Because it’s popular 
5. Because it provides the Japanese 
with a glimpse of a desired future 
If we examine deeper all of those 5 
factors, some of them are not relevant 
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anymore to the recent phenomena. The 
ODA is not “there” anymore since it has 
been the source of problem of the 
relationship between US and Japan. The 
US, as already explain above, often 
criticized this kind of policy. The case of 
gulf war that made the high tension 
between these two countries had 
haunted Japan, that now under Koizumi 
administration Japan became more 
obedience to the US demand.   
The ODA is also no longer gaining 
the, at least, most popular support. The 
economic declining in Japan, together 
with some accuses of ineffective 
implementation has raise intensive 
demand for the scheme reform. In this 
case the Yasumoto theory that 
mentioned about the popularity of ODA 
scheme is not applicable anymore. This 
fact also implied that ODA was not the 
most convenient and available tools of 
national diplomacy, like it used to be. 
The pressure from people and the Diet 
regarding the cut of the budget for the 
ODA makes it difficult for the government 
to formulate the scheme in such way to 
gain its bargaining position in the 
international politic. 
In fact the issue of reform will be the 
center point of discussion of this paper. 
This reform, however, would impact on 
the changing relationship between the 
donor and recipient countries in both 
ways, positively and negatively. 
Indonesia as the main recipient country 
of the scheme will be the good case of 
this reform especially when it’s connected 
to the recent issue on the Aceh Free 
Movement.  
 
D. Japan’s ODA to Indonesia 
The ODA scheme has the important 
role to the development in Indonesia. 
Since the beginning of the scheme 
Indonesia has been the top recipient 
countries of Japan’s bilateral ODA. In 
1999 it received US $ 1,605.83 million, or 
16.30 percent from total. While in 2000, 
it received US $ 970.10 million (10.06%) 
and in 2001, the amount was US $ 
880.07 million (11.54%).  
If we look at the figure above, the 
amount of ODA is decreasing. Actually 
this didn’t only happen to Indonesia. In 
fact in overall the amount of money in 
the ODA scheme was reduced by 
Japanese government due to some 
reforms. Some factors have been caused 
the reducing of the ODA amount. 
However the main factor was the 
economic declining that occurred in 
Japan. The reducing of the ODA in 2001 
also marked the end of the era of aid 
super power.  
The basic factor of Japan’s ODA to 
Indonesia is that Indonesia 
geographically is important to Japan in 
terms of sea transportation and provides 
oil, gas and other natural resources. This 
kind of relationship has been very 
important to Japan in the last 20 years. 
In the year 1998 and 1999, following 
the financial crisis that hit south-east Asia 
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countries, Japan arrange the huge 
amount of emergency financial 
assistance packages. Those packages 
were sent through Program sector loans 
by Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC), The New Miyazawa 
Initiative by Ministry of Finance, Special 
Yen-loan Program by Ministry of 
Economic, Trade and Industry, also 
through World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank.  
Among those channels used, the New 
Miyazawa Initiative and Special Yen-
Loans are especially for the countries 
that suffered from the financial crisis. 
The objective of the initiative, that was 
announced in October 1998, is to help 
the Asian economic recovering by giving 
the middle and short term loan. In 
addition, according to Kawakami, it 
seemed that Japanese government hope 
this initiative would be the triggered to 
develop the support mechanism of 
regional currency, that is Yen will play 
significant role in Asia (Sanoko 
Kawakami, 2004). The amount of 162.4 
billion yen has been given to Indonesia in 
1998 and 1999 based on the Miyazawa 
Initiative.  
On December 1998 METI announced 
the Special Yen Loan scheme to Asian 
countries to support the Miyazawa 
Initiative. This loan in fact used for 
recovering the domestic economic of 
Japan itself because it’s totally tied to the 
procurement of Japanese export. The 
total amount of 600 billion yen from this 
loan must be used to purchase the goods 
and services from Japan’s companies. 
From this point of view, we can see that 
ODA is attached with some commercial 
requirements.  
 
E. The ODA Reform 
As it’s mentioned above, in 1998 
Japan end its dominance as the top 
donor country for the first time since 
1992. This was also for the first time 
Japan’s ODA is a controversial public 
issue. As Altbach maintained, politician 
and their constituents are engaged in a 
heated national debate over the need to 
reform the nation’s powerful government 
ministries, and at the same time, to 
reduce the swelling public sector debt. 
The recent wave of scandals and 
bankruptcies that have shaken the 
financial sector, together with the 
economy's continued sluggishness, has 
focused even more attention on these 
issues. Japan's foreign aid program, long 
insulated from public scrutiny, has come 
under fire because of its relationship to 
both administrative and fiscal reform. 
Starting from 2002, following the 
global change (post 911 incident) the 
ODA scheme has been through some 
reforms. The new initiatives in the 
scheme include: lower-cost loans for 
environmental or "green" ODA, increased 
efforts to foster private-sector 
participation in infrastructure 
development projects and expanded 
technical cooperation that directly 
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involves more ordinary Japanese (so-
called citizen-backed ODA).  
It is very interesting to observe these 
new initiatives, because as Altbach 
mentioned, these changes are likely to 
be the beginning –not the end- of a 
period of experimentation and change in 
the nation’s development assistance 
program. In this case I would like to 
spotlight the last point of these changes, 
that is the citizen-backed ODA. I also 
would like to connect it with the rise of 
NGO’s movement in Japan recently. 
 
F. The NGO in Japan at a glance 
The rise of NGOs movement in Japan 
first started in the late 1980s and gained 
greater momentum in the early to mid 
1990s. As Reiman explained, from the 
mid 1990s, a few changes in the political 
process and the political opportunity 
structure have been occurring in Japan 
and this greater space for NGO 
participation provides another part of the 
explanation for why new groups were 
able to form and grow in the 1990s. 
Interactions between the NGO and 
government are no longer the tense 
rarities they were in the 1980s and 
earlier (Reiman, 2001). 
Moreover as Reiman said in his paper 
about the deeper involvement of NGOs in 
the political process, in 1997, the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF) started a similar 
quarterly dialogue with advocacy NGOs 
interested Multilateral Development Bank 
(MDB) issues.  And in 1998, the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
also started quarterly meetings with 
international development NGOs. In 
addition to these now institutionalized 
dialogues, in the late 1990s NGO 
representatives started to also appear on 
advisory councils at both MOFA and MOF 
and are currently on a MOFA committee 
set up to review the process of reform of 
official development assistance (ODA) 
policies, procedures and institutions.  
When Japan hosted the G-8 Summit in 
Okinawa in 2000, it became the first 
government to officially include NGOs at 
a G-7 Summit by sponsoring an "NGO 
Center" and assigning a MOFA official to 
handle NGO relations with the creation of 
the new post of "Ambassador in Charge 
of Civil Society 
Up until now there are number of 
NGOs in Japan. The main groups 
interested in the areas of Japanese ODA 
reform and MDBs include: the Pacific Asia 
Resource Center (PARC), Friends of the 
Earth Japan (FOE-J), the Japan Tropical 
Forest Action Network (JATAN), the 
Japan International Volunteer Center 
(JVC), Mekong Watch, Japan APEC 
Monitor NGO Network, Japan Indonesia 
NGO Network (JANNI), the Institute for 
Alternative Community Development 
(IACOD) and the ADB Fukuoka NGO 
Forum. All these NGOs would play bigger 
role in the future as the ODA reform 
enable them to have a deeper 
involvement. 
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G. Politically String Attached on 
Aceh?  
The NGOs that concern in ODA 
program have the contribution to the 
reform of the scheme. They so far had 
been urged for more transparency and 
greater accountability. Moreover by the 
new reform of the ODA scheme, these 
NGOs have the opportunity to influence 
the decision making process and the 
evaluation of ODA implementation. This 
kind of new mechanism will bring the 
new consequence for the implementation 
itself.  
On the other hand some NGOs also 
concern about the implementation of 
human rights and democracy in recipient 
countries. In case of Indonesia, the 
handling of Aceh Free Movement (GAM) 
has been the spotlight of criticism among 
the international NGOs, including the one 
in Japan. As it has widely known, Aceh is 
one of Indonesian provinces that recently 
experienced instability due to some riot 
that demanding for its own liberty. The 
Indonesian government reacted with 
military operation after several talks have 
been stalled.  
Tasuku Iizuka, the spoke person of 
NGOs that concern about Indonesian 
human rights in Tokyo urged that the 
Government of Japan to put pressure on 
Indonesia to allow its representatives to 
enter Aceh. He maintained that the 
problem of Aceh cannot be solved in the 
military way. He also pointed out at the 
Japanese government policy on this 
matter is too weak because it always 
state that Japan would not interfere the 
domestic conflict in Indonesia. It seemed 
that Tokyo doesn’t want to loose a good 
relationship that has been established so 
far between these two countries. The 
tension between the two would endanger 
the Japan’s commercial interest, since 
Indonesia is one of main suppliers of raw 
materials for Japan.   
It seemed that the government of 
Japan can neglect the demand of NGOs 
to put pressure on Indonesia regarding 
Aceh. Moreover, the commercial interest 
of the big business that support LDP 
politician would remain the main priority 
in the Japanese foreign policy on 
Indonesia. However, if we should take a 
look at the new ODA regulation that 
potentially enable these NGOs to do 
more. The ODA scheme to Indonesia that 
so far has been the main source of fund 
in the development can be an effective 
mean to put the political pressure 
regarding human rights and 
democratization implementation in 
Indonesia. It is possible, however, that in 
the future the political requirements 
would attached in the financial aid 
package. If that is the case, the tension 
could not be avoided. So far, Indonesian 
government has sent a strong message 
to the foreign countries that Aceh is still 
part of Indonesia, and any interference 
to this matter would mean the disrespect 
of Indonesian sovereignty.   
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H. Conclusion 
Japan as the world’s second largest 
economy chose to be the aid great power 
instead political super power. Yet the 
global political changes that happened in 
the recent times, such as 911 incident 
and the domestic economic declining has 
induced the formulation of its foreign 
policy. 
The Japan’s financial assistance/ODA 
to the developing countries as the source 
of raw material has been the major 
element of its political diplomacy. 
However starting from late 90s, the ODA 
has been lost its immunity from public 
scrutiny and started to be the center of 
criticism. There’s a shadow of doubt 
among the people about its effectiveness 
and, furthermore, usefulness for 
recovering domestic economic. The 
demand for a reform was intensively 
sounded. Starting this new millennium, 
ODA enters a period of experimentation 
and change in the nation’s development 
assistance program. 
One of the reforms spotlighted in this 
paper is the people involvement in the 
ODA mechanism, both in formulation and 
evaluation process. This fact cannot be 
separated to the rise of NGOs movement 
in Japan starting from the mid of 1990s. 
The role of NGOs in the ODA 
implementation will be very interesting to 
observe because it will give significant 
impact to the form of ODA package to 
the recipient country. So far, it is widely 
known that the ODA is highly tied yet it is 
limited to the commercial interest. The 
grant and loan were mainly required to 
be used for purchasing the product of 
Japanese companies. Now as the reform 
took place, there’s a possibility that the 
string attached reach into the political 
domain, such as human rights and 
democracy.  
In the case of Indonesia and Aceh 
Free Movement, the Japanese NGOs that 
concern to the implementation of human 
rights has urged to the Government of 
Japan to put more pressure to Indonesia. 
This would be the dilemmatic problem to 
the government, because on the other 
hand they have to protect the business 
interest of Japanese companies in 
Indonesia (hence, to protect the financial 
source support for those politicians). 
However, it is very important for both 
countries to keep their harmonize 
relationship that has been established so 
far for the economic reason. In this case 
the government of Japan should be 
careful in handling the issue of ODA as a 
political pressure to Indonesia, otherwise 
both will suffer for any flawed policies. 
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